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Sunday, October 30, 2005
Language and Thought
The question of whether or not language determines how humans think does not yield a simple, concise answer that accounts for all possible variations within reality. Few questions raised in the social sciences do. For this reason, the language-cognition debate in anthropology has been ongoing since its establishment as a discipline and continues to explore aspects of language, thought, and action. The two hypothetical extremes of each respective side of the debate are equally implausible: language has nothing to do with how humans view and act within the world or humans are subject to the rules of language and as a result their experiences and perceptions are inseparable from the dictates of this structure. The former does not take into account the validity of linguistic relativity while the latter seems to deny human ingenuity and creativity. This short paper will present brief overviews of representative readings relevant to the debate. It will be shown that while neither of the extremes mentioned above serve as an accurate synthesis of current linguistic evidence, arguing that language does indeed influence how we think will lead to the most reasonable conclusion.
Taking Sides (2005) presents the debate as if it were indeed a strict “yes/no” issue. By providing brief representative writings from each side, the authors allow the reader to compare and contrast at a broad level. However, after reading each of the sides and considering what is presented, one comes away with the notion that while we are not trapped within the walls of linguistic determinism there is certainly a degree of relativity between different human languages and the way their speakers think. Pinker admits there is a relationship between language and thought but that the former does not determine the latter in the way that Whorf hypothesized. Gumperz and Levinson are more generous in the various ways language structure influences thoughts.
If language does not determine how we think, how are we to describe what is happening within the heads of all humans when they process information and manifest these thoughts verbally? Pinker proposes a universal mental language, mentalese (Endicott and Welsch 2005). Teng (1999) contends that Fodor’s version, a Language of Thought hypothesis, is not supported by the systematicity of language and that “cognitive activity can occur without a language of thought.” If cognitive activity can indeed occur as Teng proposes then one is able to process sensory information without “thinking in English,” for example. I tentatively agree with this notion to the extent that it does not completely separate spoken language and all aspects of thought processes.
Hill and Manheim (1992) describe a shift in the linguistic paradigm to include the “fragmented and contingent nature of human worlds,” whereas previous linguistic research took for granted the “wholeness and persistence” of these worlds. Another central issue of the authors’ thesis is that the linguistic relativity espoused by Boas, Sapir, and Whorf is to be taken as more of an epistemological stance rather than a hypothesis in the traditional sense. As a result linguists are rethinking the ways in which they explore the connections between certain linguistic phenomena and psychobiology.
The authors go on to suggest that the traditionally-accepted version of the “Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis” is inconsistent with the writing of both men and that, as mentioned above, it is not a hypothesis. Several alternatives to traditional linguistic frameworks are explored, including cognitive linguistics and Silverstein’s interpretive rendering of linguistic relativism. Hill and Manheim’s central thesis of pulling away from universal relationships of language in favor of a focus on ideologies as they relate to specific languages signals that there is room (and perhaps a need) for a shift in thinking.
Hill and Manheim also make note of Sherzer’s (1987) discourse-centered approach to language studies. And like the previous article discussed Sherzer aims to reevaluate (then) current ways of looking at culture/language relationships. Essentially Sherzer believes that by looking at discourse, or grammar-independent oral or written interactions, one can reconceptualize the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. He gives a handful of useful examples that illustrate his point that discourse is manifested in the multi-dimensional aspects of word usage and sentence structure.
Finally, Mendoza-Denton (1996) describes an interesting and provocative examination of how Latina gang girls speak about and conceptualize their use of makeup in relation to their broader appearance and demeanor. She starts off by indirectly criticizing Geraldo's episode where he tries to "feminize" girls that don't fit into the popular ideal of what it is to be feminine in America. While this is indeed a valid criticism in my opinion, I fail to see the same type of subtle criticism of cholas that would seem to naturally come from the same or at least a similar line of reasoning.
Mendoza-Denton is critical of the Geraldo episode because it perpetuates the notion that there is a naturalized gender that should be achieved by all young females (if they are to be “girls” in the traditional sense). By not following these guidelines (appropriate makeup, tight clothes, short skirts, etc.) they are outside of the mainstream. Indeed, they are not subscribing to the ideals of “hegemonic masculine gender norms.”
Mendoza-Denton’s criticism seems to be based on an underlying contempt of this ideal, as indeed much of feminine philosophy is. Mendoza-Denton believes the cholas are resisting the gender ideal that is often forced upon girls (at least in America) from birth by creating their own form of unique femininity. From this, I inferred (either correctly or incorrectly) that she believes popularized gender ideals (i.e. girls are supposed to wear tight clothes and Barbie makeup) have turned girls into zombies so to speak, that they follow these roles like sheep in an attempt to fit in socially or in many cases, stand out by being more feminine (prettier) than the next girl. Overall, this article raises very important issues and observations about culturally manifested and perpetuated gender ideals and how these ideals are sometimes “hijacked” (not with a negative connotation) to suit the aspirations of a distinct subculture or group, in this case the cholas.
As these readings indicate, there are no clear answers to the relationships between language and cognition. While the traditional Sapir-Whorf model suggests, to at least two different degrees, that how we think is dependent on the language that we learn, is being challenged more and more I am hesitant to completely abandon it at this juncture. I feel that the evidence seems to show that there is indeed a relationship between language, culture, and worldview (or ideology) but that the use of the word “determine” is too strong. To say that our cognitive processes are determined by language structure devalues much of what makes us uniquely human to begin with.
Works Cited
Endicott, Kirk M. and Robert L. Welsch, eds.
2005 Taking Sides: Clashing Views on Controversial Issues in Anthropology, Third Edition.
Dubuque: McGraw Hill.
Hill, Jane H. and Bruce Manheim
1992 Language and World View. Annual Review of Anthropology 21: 381-406.
Mendoza-Denton, Norma
1996 ‘Muy Macha’: Gender and Ideology in Gang-Girls’ Discourse about Makeup. Ethnos
61(1-2): 47-63.
Sherzer, Joel
1987 A Discourse-Centered Approach to Language and Culture. American Anthropologist
89(2): 295-309.
Teng, Norman Yujen
1999 The Language of Thought and the Embodied Nature of Language Use. Philosophical
Studies 94: 237-251.
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Posted by Will at October 30, 2005 02:35 PM in Papers and Essays